Opciones reales y teoría de juegos para la valuación de acuerdos estratégicos

Abstract

Real Options and Games Theory model for Valuing Strategic Commitments

Strategic decisions regarding investments in equipment and human resources for the provision of specialized services present exit barriers and high transactional costs. They involve exposure to multiple sources of uncertainty. Their analysis and valuation require models based on Real Options and Game Theory. Motivated by this, a model is proposed to value strategic contracts for the provision of highly specific services, within the framework of simple real options and games (SROG). Its functioning is explored and analyzed using case study methodology in management. For this, formal and informal service contracts of supporting agent analysis are utilized in unconventional shale drilling. From the perspective of the service provider, the model is applied and adapted to value streams of contingent payments derived from strategies, suboptimal outcomes due to the lack of formal agreements, and the value of the exchange option. In the cases of formal supply agreements, it allows for quantifying economic penalties for non-compliance from an SROG perspective. Finally, conclusions are drawn regarding its scope and limitations.